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In opposition to the traditional conception of scientific laws as uni-
versal and exceptionless generalizations that hold everywhere and 
throughout all times, some philosophers of science have proposed 
the idea of a ceteris paribus law (CP law), i.e., a law that is true “all 
else being equal”, in the sense that it can admit of exceptions because 
of the influence of interfering factors. The legitimacy of CP laws has 
divided the philosophical community. Some argue that all scientific 
laws are CP laws, others argue that CP laws are simply unacceptable, 
and a third group claims that science contains both CP laws (in the 
so-called special sciences) and strict laws (in basic physics).
The debate on CP laws has important implications for our under-
standing of the human sciences, because if we accept the existence 
of laws in sciences like psychology or sociology, these laws, far from 
being strict, should be CP laws. Furthermore, if we could estab-
lish some differences between CP laws in the human and the natural 
sciences, such a difference could help us to understand the relation 
between these two scientific domains.
In what follows, I will first discuss the concept of CP law and 
present some proponents of such laws (1). In order to explore the 
significance of this debate for the human sciences, I will discuss Da-
vidson’s and Fodor’s stance on the status of CP laws in the human 
sciences (2). After these introductory sections, I will argue that in 
the human sciences it is much more difficult, not only in practice, 
but also in principle, to cope with interfering factors and to refine 
ceteris paribus clauses (3). Against hermeneutic and strict naturalistic 
perspectives, I propose an account of the human sciences that rec-
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ognizes the methodological role of both generalizations and rational-
ity assumptions; in particular, I will stress the need for interpreta-
tive/hermeneutic methods to control the vagueness of ceteris paribus 
clauses (4).
1
A fundamental problem in the philosophy of the human sciences con-
sists in the existence or possibility of laws in these sciences. Because 
of the complexity of the factors that can influence human behav-
iour, generalizations in psychology and sociology, for instance, have 
a somewhat fragile status, especially when they are couched in an in-
tentional vocabulary. Predictions based on such generalizations may 
well fail, and it is for this reason that the idea of CP laws, understood 
as laws that admit of exceptions, becomes relevant for understanding 
the human sciences.1
A CP law describes real tendencies or causal powers, but it ide-
alizes the phenomena to be explained and abstracts them from the 
possible interference of factors that lie beyond its scope. It is in this 
sense that CP laws admit of exceptions and can be contrasted with 
strict laws. According to the traditional conception, scientific laws 
are universally valid, empirically confirmable and counterfactual-
supporting generalizations. They can be either strict or statistic, but 
in both cases they are conceived as exceptionless. A CP law, on the 
other hand, is a generalization that is true “all else being equal”, i.e., 
exceptions are possible because of the interference of an indefinite 
number of factors that cannot be specified in advance.
The idea of CP laws is, of course, controversial. In the first place, 
these laws seem to be vacuous. Let us consider the following for-
mulation of a law with a ceteris paribus clause: “All As are Bs, except 
when they are not”. This is a caricature of a CP law, but it points to 
a real problem with CP laws, its apparent vacuity. Closely related to 
this objection is the charge of vagueness. CP laws are true all else be-
ing equal. But what is exactly “all else” (ceteris)? And what is the exact 
1 Ceteris paribus laws have already been labelled as soft laws (cf. Horgan/Tien-
son 1996), and they are, as such, appropriate candidates for the role of laws of the 
so-called soft sciences.
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meaning of “being equal” (paribus) in a particular context? If CP laws 
lack determinate truth conditions, advocates of truth-conditional 
theories of meaning can doubt that they have meaning.
Last, but not least, CP laws seem to evade the requirements of 
testability or falsifiability. The idea that laws may have exceptions 
because of the interference of unexpected factors threatens to im-
munize them against empirical refutation; it allows the scientist to 
hold a law in the light of recalcitrant evidence by introducing ad hoc 
hypotheses.2
However, and according to their proponents, CP laws are legiti-
mate. To begin with, there are many scientific generalizations that 
have exceptions but are considered as genuine laws; Boyle’s law and 
the law of supply and demand are two good examples. The support-
ers of CP laws also claim that, in order to study a very complex 
world, science has inevitably to appeal to abstractions and idealiza-
tions. CP laws belong to these idealizations; they single out causal 
tendencies that, far from operating in isolation, interact with many 
other causal tendencies. Since events result from a combination of 
causes, a real tendency may be overridden by other causal forces, 
and this would entitle us to introduce ceteris paribus clauses in law-
statements.
Carl Hempel’s reflections on the role of provisos was a major 
source of inspiration for supporters of CP laws. He claimed that 
Newton’s law of gravitation involves certain assumptions and can 
lead to inaccurate predictions if, for instance, non-gravitational forc-
es interfere with gravitational ones. As a result, predictions based 
on Newton’s law are true, provided that no significant external forces 
(gravitational or non-gravitational ones) affect a planetary system. 
Since an indefinite number of forces may act on the planets, the pro-
viso seems to have an open-ended character similar to ceteris paribus 
clauses. For this reason, some authors attributed to Hempel the the-
sis that even the fundamental laws of physics contain ceteris paribus 
2 In the words of Roberts (2004: 162): “hedged regularities cannot be discov-
ered by science, because they are not empirically testable. The hedge functions 
as an ‘escape clause’ that allows any hypothesized hedged regularity to escape 
empirical refutation: Whenever you discover a counterexample, claim that there 
has been an interference of some kind, so that the case is outside the scope of the 
hypothesis and does not falsify it”.
clauses (cf., e.g., Fodor 1991). This interpretation of Hempel’s con-
ception of provisos is, however, dubious. Earman and Roberts (1999: 
442-446) have argued, in my view persuasively, that the conditions 
of the Hempelian provisos are not relative to the truth of law state-
ments, but only to the validity of the application of a theory. This 
point distinguishes his provisos from current accounts of ceteris pa-
ribus clauses.
Another important voice in the debate on CP laws is Nancy Cart-
wright. She was known for a long time as a supporter of CP laws 
because of her opposition to a Humean understanding of laws as reg-
ularities and her thesis that scientific laws should be understood in 
the “language of powers, capacities or natures and related concepts such 
as interfere, inhibit, facilitate, and trigger” (Cartwright 2002: 150). She 
has, indeed, claimed that scientific laws are CP laws in the sense that 
“they hold only relative to the successful repeated operation of a no-
mological machine” (Cartwright 1997: 66). By nomological machine 
she understands a set of capacities that cause in a stable environment 
the regularities that are described by scientific laws. Nomological 
machines are also described in her work as the object of scientific 
models.3
Fodor (1991) and Pietroski/Rey (1995) represent another influ-
ential defence of CP laws. In spite of some differences, their accounts 
of CP laws share some common assumptions, namely that scientific 
explanations rely on laws and that strict laws must be exceptionless. 
Since many scientific generalizations admit of exceptions, they claim 
that for a given CP law there is a condition that, when realized, elim-
inates exceptions. Fodor calls such a condition a “completer”. The 
combination of a CP law with the corresponding completer amounts 
to a strict or exceptionless law. In the case of Pietrosky and Rey, 
CP laws are considered genuine laws if prediction failures can be 
explained by a fact that has an independent explanatory role. More 
precisely, an exception to a scientific law is legitimate if we can in-
dicate an interfering factor and if this factor can be explained on the 
3 More recently, Cartwright has distanced herself from CP laws, but the point 
is apparently terminological; she does not agree with characterizations of CP laws 
as laws that neither can be stated in precise and closed form nor entail strict or 
statistical regularities (cf. Cartwright 2002: 149). At any rate, she remains faith-
ful to an understanding of laws in terms of powers and capacities.
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basis of an independent theory. This condition allows us to prevent 
ad hoc manoeuvres in science. Pietroski and Rey illustrate this point 
in the following metaphorical terms:
But there need be no intrinsic problem about ineliminable CP-clauses. 
Briefly, we claim that such clauses are cheques written on the bank of 
independent theories, their substance and warrant deriving from the 
substance and warrant of those theories, which determine whether the 
cheque can be cashed.” (Pietroski/Rey 1995: 82)
This approach has the advantage of defending CP laws from the 
charge of vacuity without trying to give determinate truth condi-
tions to them.
At a more methodological level, there are some elaborate at-
tempts to establish the legitimacy of CP laws. A case in point is Har-
old Kincaid. In chapter 3 of his Philosophical Foundations of the Social 
Sciences, he claims that, appearances notwithstanding, CP laws are 
serious and testable laws. It would be inappropriate in this context 
to delve into his reflections on the testability problem, but one can 
highlight some of his main points. He stresses, for instance, that real 
situations fit sometimes scientific idealizations, and in these cases 
CP laws become clearly testable. Furthermore, exceptions can be 
often explained away by reference to well-established laws or causal 
mechanisms, and successive refinements may increase the accuracy 
of the predictions. Kincaid also stresses that CP laws may predict 
novel facts and support counterfactuals.
He cites in this context the work of the sociologist Jeffrey Paige 
on the relations between agrarian structure and political behaviour 
as an example of good social science that offers us lawlike gener-
alizations (Kincaid 1996: 70-80). By gathering the relevant evi-
dence, Paige formulated a set of interesting generalizations that do 
not express strict regularities, but have other traits of the traditional 
conception of law; they are, namely, empirically confirmable and 
counterfactual-supporting. Here are some examples of these gener-
alizations:
1. Plantation systems (where owners depend on capital and 
workers on wages) encourage collective action and labor re-
forms.
2. Commercial hacienda systems (where both owners and cul-
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tivators get their income from land) favour agrarian revolts.
3. Large estate systems (where owners get their income from 
the land and cultivators from wages) tend to lead to revolu-
tionary movements.
Paige was able to confront these generalizations with the available 
data and concluded that they hold generally. The generalizations in-
clude, of course, ceteris paribus clauses, but one of the merits of his 
work consists precisely in showing how a researcher can refine the 
ceteris paribus clauses by considering the relevant interfering factors 
and by explaining their influence on the causal tendencies expressed 
by the generalizations. For instance, he shows how contagion effects 
(the increased probability of an event on the basis of previous oc-
currences of similar events) and the action of urban political parties 
influence the political behaviour of cultivators.
What can we conclude from the preceding considerations? It 
would be too ambitious to try to settle here the intricate debate on 
the legitimacy of CP laws.4 For the purposes of the present article, 
it is sufficient to clarify the concept of CP law, to understand the 
motivation behind it, to evaluate the significance of scientific gen-
eralizations with ceteris paribus clauses and to compare their status in 
the natural and in the human sciences. In fact, even if one refuses to 
accept CP laws as genuine laws, one may well accept that there are 
many scientific generalizations that admit of exceptions, but are test-
able and important for science.5
As we have seen, many respectable lawlike statements must in-
evitably idealize phenomena that, in the real world, are the result of 
very complex causal interactions that cannot be grasped by unquali-
fied universal statements. Lawlike generalizations typically describe 
4 For a good survey on the main accounts of CP laws and their difficulties, see 
Earman/Roberts 1999.
5 A case in point is Jim Woodward, who denies the existence of CP laws, but 
accepts the corresponding generalizations: “While I reject the idea that general-
izations found in the special sciences are ceteris paribus laws, I fully agree that 
many of those generalizations are ‘scientifically legitimate’, that they are testable 
and in fact strongly supported by evidence […]. My claim is that construing those 
generalizations as ceteris paribus laws is the wrong way to defend their usefulness 
and legitimacy” (Woodward 2002: 306).
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a causal tendency, but a tendency that interacts in the real world 
with other tendencies. This lends to generalizations with ceteris pa-
ribus clauses a prima facie legitimacy. However, we should keep in 
mind that the existence of ceteris paribus clauses weakens a nomologi-
cal statement and may undermine its explanatory power.
2
In order to evaluate the significance of CP laws for the human scienc-
es it is convenient to consider the work of Davidson and Fodor in this 
context. Both of them accept the existence of CP laws in the special 
sciences, but evaluate differently their role in the human sciences. 
Davidson argued in a series of influential papers that there are no 
strict psychological laws. By strict law he understands the traditional 
conception of law as a non-accidental generalization, characterized 
by being empirically confirmable and by supporting counterfactuals. 
Intentional psychology produces many useful generalizations, but, 
according to Davidson, they are not strict laws; far from being ex-
ceptionless, they are vulnerable to the interference of an indefinite 
number of factors that cannot be specified in advance.
His defence of the Principle of the Anomalism of the Mental is 
based on a rejection of psychophysical laws. The basic point behind 
psychophysical anomalism is the claim that the vocabularies of phys-
ics and psychology are incommensurable:
There are no strict psychophysical laws because of the disparate com-
mitments of the mental and physical schemes. It is a feature of physical 
reality that physical change can be explained by laws that connect it 
with other changes and conditions physically described. It is a feature 
of the mental that the attribution of mental phenomena must be re-
sponsible to the background of reasons, beliefs, and intentions of the 
individual. (Davidson 1980: 222)
According to Davidson, the gap between the vocabularies of physics 
and psychology results from the holistic and normative character of 
the psychological domain. The content of mental states is partly de-
termined by their reciprocal relations and its interpretation is based 
on rationality assumptions:
Any effort at increasing the accuracy and power of a theory of be-
haviour forces us to bring more and more of the whole system of the 
agent’s beliefs and motives directly into account. But in inferring this 
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system from the evidence, we necessarily impose conditions of coher-
ence, rationality, and consistency. These conditions have no echo in 
physical theory, which is why we can look for no more than rough cor-
relations between psychological and physical phenomena” (Davidson 
1980: 231)
Another key point of the Davidsonian defence of the anomalism of 
the mental departs from the idea that a strict or exceptionless law 
requires a closed domain, like the domain of physics. In order to ex-
plain physical phenomena we do not need to accommodate the pos-
sible interference of non-physical causes; on the contrary, physicists 
and philosophers of science endorse the principle of the causal closure 
of physics. But the psychological domain is clearly not closed. Psy-
chological phenomena are exposed to the action of non-psychological 
causes; biological, chemical and physical factors. For this reason, we 
cannot formulate a psychological theory that provides a complete 
coverage of the psychological domain. Psychological anomalism, the 
thesis that there are no strict laws describing correlations between 
psychological phenomena, can be presented as a consequence of the 
conjunction of psychophysical anomalism and the claim that the psy-
chological domain is not closed (cf. Davidson 1980: 224).
Davidson is aware that scientific laws may admit exceptions, but 
he claims that in the natural sciences it is possible, in principle, to re-
fine and improve laws in order to eliminate exceptions. Psychologi-
cal generalizations are not refinable in this sense. Thus, in “Psychol-
ogy as Philosophy” he clearly dismisses the possibility of strict laws 
dealing with beliefs and desires, the kind of laws that could ground 
intentional explanations of the human behaviour. In his perspective, 
it is hopeless to expect laws of the type “whenever a man has such-
and-such beliefs and desires and such-and-such further conditions 
are satisfied, he will act in such-and such a way” (Davidson 1980: 
233). He claims that:
What is needed in the case of action, if we are to predict on the basis 
of beliefs and desires, is a quantitative calculus that brings all relevant 
beliefs and desires into the picture. There is no hope of refining the 
simple pattern of explanation on the basis of reasons into such a calcu-
lus. (Davidson 1980: 233)
The lack of precision of psychological laws cannot be explained in 
the same way that we explain the lack of precision of some natural 
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scientific laws; the laws involved in meteorological explanations and 
forecasts, for instance. The problem with psychological generaliza-
tions does not consist simply in the complexity of the factors that 
intervene in the human behaviour. Meteorological forecasts are ad-
mittedly fallible because of the complexity of meteorological phe-
nomena, and earthquakes, according to the current status of seis-
mology, cannot be predicted. Serious laws may have ceteris paribus 
clauses in order to accommodate the possible interference of factors 
that generate exceptions to them, but Davidson thinks that there 
is, at any rate, an important distinction between the ceteris paribus 
clauses of natural scientific laws and the corresponding clauses in pu-
tative psychological laws. In the former case, but not in the latter, it 
is possible, in principle, “to determine in advance whether or not the 
conditions of application are satisfied” (Davidson 1980: 233). This 
claim should be understood in the light of Davidson’s holistic and 
normative conception of the psychological domain. Because different 
individuals have different sets of beliefs and desires, generalizations 
couched in an intentional vocabulary express mere tendencies and 
cannot aspire to the degree of precision that characterizes natural 
scientific laws. Furthermore, any attempt to explain and predict ac-
tions on the basis of beliefs and desires must rely, according to Da-
vidson’s Principle of Charity, on rationality assumptions, and these 
assumptions are not rigid; there are different ways to rationalize an 
agent’s behaviour.
Davidson’s defence of psychological anomalism is based on im-
portant insights, but is not satisfactorily developed in his work. In 
particular, he does not clarify the key notion of ceteris paribus law, al-
though he appeals to laws of this kind, namely when he argues for the 
causal efficacy of mental events. In “Thinking Causes”, Davidson ap-
peals to non-strict laws in order to save his anomalous monism from 
the charge of epiphenomenalism. In fact, according to Davidson’s 
principle that causal relations are covered by laws, he seems to be 
forced to appeal to psychophysical laws if he wants to attribute causal 
powers to mental states, but since strict laws cannot be couched in 
a mental vocabulary, laws that correlate mental events with physical 
events should be non-strict laws. A further advantage of these laws 
consists in the fact that they do not entail a physical reduction of the 
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mental. 6 Non-strict laws have, according to Davidson, the merit 
of explaining the causal efficacy of the mental while avoiding at the 
same time the threat of reductionism.
Fodor claimed, in opposition to Davidson, that the status of psy-
chological generalizations does not differ from the status of many 
other laws in the natural sciences. Fodor concedes that intentional 
laws are non-strict laws, but does not think that this point raises a 
particular epistemological problem for psychology, because sciences 
like biology, meteorology or geology rely also on non-strict laws. 
Nomological generalizations in the so-called special sciences admit 
of exceptions, because of the presence of interfering factors that can-
not be taken into account in the formulation of the law, but it is 
usually possible to explain exceptions to a law in the vocabulary of 
another, more basic sciences. In the case of psychology, exceptions 
to generalizations could be explained with the resources of sciences 
like neurology or biochemistry:
Exceptions to the generalizations of a special science are typically in-
explicable from the point of view of (that is, in the vocabulary of) that 
science. That’s one of the things that make it a special science. But, of 
course, it may it may nevertheless be perfectly possible to explain the 
exceptions in the vocabulary of some other science. (Fodor 1987: 6)
Fodor argues that the same holds for commonsense psychology; the 
ceteris paribus clauses of its generalizations are “ineliminable from the 
point of view of its proprietary conceptual resources”, but “can be 
discharged in the vocabulary of some lower-level science” (Fodor 
1987: 6).
3
Against Fodor, I argue that there are significant differences between 
psychological generalizations and laws of natural science. CP laws are 
prima facie legitimate because of the existence of interference effects 
6 Davidson was sensitive, in his context, to Kim’s following objection: “The 
trouble is that once we begin talking about correlations and dependencies be-
tween specific psychological and physical properties, we are in effect talking 
about psycho-physical laws, and these laws raise the spectre of unwanted physical 
reductionism. Where there are psycho-physical laws, there is always the threat, 
or promise, of psycho-physical reduction.” (Kim 1993: 278-9).
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between different causal factors, but we must distinguish between 
two different types of interferences. The first type is what I will call 
external interference, and it is present whenever an exception to a gen-
eralization is caused by factors that belong to another domain, which 
is covered by another theory or science. It is dubious that this kind of 
interference has the same form in psychology and in natural sciences 
like biology or geology. In fact, psychological generalizations cannot 
be linked to, say, neurology in the same way that biological process-
es, for instance, can be linked to chemical processes. Psychological 
entities are partly constituted, as Davidson argued, on the basis of 
rationality assumptions and normative principles, and this sets them 
apart from the world of natural phenomena. By studying the chemi-
cal basis of a biological phenomenon one may understand it better, 
but neurological studies do not contribute to our understanding of 
reasons. McDowell’s distinction between the “space of reasons” and 
the “realm of laws” may clarify this point. Those who argue that 
the relation between psychology and the corresponding lower-level 
theories (such as biology or chemistry) is analogous to the relation 
between higher-level and lower-level theories in the natural sciences 
neglect the fact that in the former case we are in presence of two 
different forms of intelligibility; in the latter case, we are dealing 
with different levels in the same domain (the “realm of law”). This 
means that in psychology and other human sciences the phenomena 
of external interference are much more difficult to handle (not only 
in practice, but also in principle).
The second form of interference, internal interference, occurs when 
the interfering factors belong to the theoretical domain of the gen-
eralization. In this regard, there is an important difference between 
psychology (as well as other human sciences) and the natural sci-
ences. In the latter sciences, there are no in-principle obstacles to 
a gradual refinement of ceteris paribus clauses and to a formulation 
of laws that are exceptionless in their own domain, but there are 
good reasons to think that the same does not hold for laws involv-
ing intentional notions. Any generalization in terms of beliefs and 
desires is always threatened by the interference of competing beliefs 
and desires in a way that challenges any theoretical approach. Two 
arguments can be invoked in this context. In the first place, and as-
suming as true a holistic account of the psychological realm, the fact 
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that the content of mental states is determined by their location in a 
network of propositional attitudes and that different interpretations 
may determine differently the content of beliefs, desires or inten-
tions makes it impossible to fix all the variables involved in intention-
al explanations. In the second place, John McDowell’s reflections on 
the uncodifiability of human rationality and, in particular, his thesis 
that human actions cannot be explained in terms of deductions from 
a definite set of universal principles also undermine the possibility of 
explaining human action on the basis of a nomological system.7 The 
uncodifiability thesis is quite plausible in the light of the serious dif-
ficulties that we face when we try to apply abstract, universal prin-
ciples to concrete, particular cases. On the one hand, the vagueness 
and generality of principles contrast with the uncontrollable diver-
sity of particular situations that defies any set of abstract rules. As a 
result, it is often possible to arrive at different conclusions departing 
from the same principle. On the other hand, there are also cases 
where equally valuable principles may contradict one another. Now, 
if an agent cannot act on the basis of a precise set of universal prin-
ciples, the psychologist or sociologist cannot, a fortiori, explain her 
action in the form of deductions from universal principles or laws. 
As a result, generalizations couched in an intentional vocabulary do 
not support accurate predictions.
We can now raise the following question: does the explanation 
of human action involve ceteris paribus laws? It is not easy to answer 
this question, because putative ceteris paribus laws have, in the human 
sciences, an indefinite status; they are a borderline case between, on 
the one hand, non-scientific rules of thumb or rough generalizations, 
useful in our everyday practices, and, on the other hand, the laws of 
the natural sciences.
We could say that the concept of law is a “family-resemblance” 
concept in the sense that it identifies different kinds of lawlike gen-
eralizations without being able to reduce them to a well-defined set 
of defining characteristics. First, there are exceptionless laws. Some 
argue, as we have seen, that even the most basic laws of physics are 
not exceptionless; for instance, magnetic forces may create excep-
tions to the law of gravitation. However, and since apparent excep-
7 See also Child 1993.
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tions to physical laws may be explained away with the help of other 
physical laws, we may consider the fundamental laws of physics as 
exceptionless. Second, there are the non-strict laws of the natural 
special sciences. Third, there are laws of the human special sciences 
which are not couched in an intentional vocabulary. They are vulner-
able to forms of interference that are typical of the human sciences; 
for instance, ethical or cultural norms may interfere with well-estab-
lished economic laws. Fourth, there are generalizations couched in 
an intentional vocabulary; they are such a pale echo of the basic laws 
of physics that it becomes disputable to call them laws. Their excep-
tions are ineliminable because there is not a theory able to deal with 
the effects of internal interference.
4
Now we must address a further problem: by claiming that the sta-
tus of scientific generalizations is not the same in the natural and in 
the human sciences, are we not contributing to a devaluation of the 
human sciences and returning to an old-fashioned methodological 
dualism in the realm of science? The answer, as we shall see, is no.
According to the position defended in this article, the explana-
tion of human action is based to a large extent on rationality assump-
tions. When we want to understand an action, we want typically to 
understand the reasons that motivated the action, and a mere refer-
ence to behavioural regularities is not enough. Human actions are, 
in most cases, the result of deliberations. It would be quite odd for 
an agent to take decisions on the basis of her previous behaviour and 
respective regularities; for the same reason, the explanation of hu-
man action cannot abstract totally from the deliberative process that 
originated a particular action. If our decisions and our self-under-
standing require the adoption of a deliberator’s stance, we cannot 
explain satisfactorily the human action relying only on observable 
regularities.8
However, one must also recognize that generalizations play an 
important role in the human sciences. In opposition to strict natural-
istic perspectives that downplay the role of rationality assumptions 
8 For an elaboration of this point, see Kim 1998.
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in the explanation of human action and hermeneutic approaches that 
neglect the role of generalizations, we should attempt to articulate 
rationality assumptions and generalizations in the human sciences.
A prominent supporter of the so-called “simulation theory” in 
philosophy of mind and cognitive science, Robert Gordon, offers 
us a good example of such an articulation. The simulation theory is 
an account of our folk-psychological ability to explain and predict 
an agent’s behaviour on the basis of an intentional vocabulary that 
includes notions like ‘belief’, ‘desire’ or ‘intention’. According to 
a particular view of folk psychology, the so-called “theory-theory”, 
folk psychology is a protoscientific theory, to the extent that it re-
lies on generalizations that, by establishing correlations between 
thoughts and actions, allow us to predict human behaviour. Simu-
lationists dispute the idea that our folk-psychological ability to ex-
plain, interpret and predict human behaviour is based on theoretical 
knowledge. Several objections may be addressed to the theory-the-
ory. For instance, it is often argued that it is implausible to attribute 
the relevant theoretical knowledge to small children who are quite 
good at explaining and predicting actions. The idea that the explana-
tion of human action follows universally shared principles is also con-
troversial. For our purposes, however, the most significant objection 
against theory theory is based on the vagueness of the putative laws 
of folk psychology. As Goldman (1995) and Gordon (1995) point 
out, the laws of folk psychology are condemned to be vague because 
of the presence of ceteris paribus clauses. In fact, the number of in-
terfering factors that can undermine predictions made on the basis 
of folk-psychological generalizations is so high that the explanatory 
relevance of such generalizations becomes questionable. As an alter-
native, simulation theorists claim that we should use ourselves as 
models for the interpretation of an agent; the proposal is to interpret 
other minds by projecting our emotions, motivations and deliberat-
ing processes.
In this context, Gordon’s suggestion that the vagueness of ceter-
is paribus clauses cab be corrected through the method of empathy 
or simulation is particularly relevant. He rightly points out that by 
transposing ourselves into other people we can have access to reasons 
or factors that can interfere with established regularities, enabling us 
to explain and predict exceptions to reliable generalizations.
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How does one know how to recognize atypical situations or to expand 
the ceteris paribus clause? An answer is ready at hand. As long as one 
applies these generalizations in the context of practical simulation, the un-
specifiable constraints on one’s own practical reasoning would enable 
one to delimit the application of these rules. This gives one something 
to start with: as one learns more about others, of course, one learns 
how to modify these constraints in applying generalizations to them. 
(Gordon 1995: 67)
The same point can be made with the help of another distinguished 
supporter of simulation theory, Jane Heal (2003: 45-62). She rightly 
points out that the epistemic status of a belief depends on its relations 
with other, relevant beliefs. As a result, the interpretation of an agent 
requires sensitivity to the beliefs that an agent considers relevant to a 
given belief. But how can we identify the relevant beliefs? Certainly 
not by theory-building, because there is not a theory of relevance. In 
order to identify relevant beliefs, we have to rely on our own judge-
ments of relevance and to interpret the agent on the basis of such 
judgements.
This appeal to simulation theory may seem to be incoherent with 
the Davidsonian premises that I presented above. Simulationists 
ground our mindreading abilities in psychological mechanisms, and 
a Davidsonian approach to the interpretation and explanation of hu-
man action is based, on the contrary, on rationality assumptions or in 
the famous Principle of Charity, according to which the interpreta-
tion of other agents must necessarily obey to presuppositions of truth 
and rationality.
However, the method of empathy or simulation is not incom-
patible with the Principle of Charity. In its initial formulations, the 
requirement of charity seemed to be a strong normative principle, 
based on an idealized assumption of truth and rationality in the in-
terpretation of other people’s utterances and actions. However, Da-
vidson’s later reflections on the Principle of Charity make it clear 
that the principle combines norms of rationality with considerations 
of psychological plausibility. The main point is not to maximize truth 
and rationality, but to avoid the attribution of unexplainable errors. 
Simulation may involve rationality assumptions to the extent that it 
reconstitutes the deliberative process of the interpretee; and char-
ity is not a purely normative principle, because it can accommodate 
psychological intuitions.
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